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I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) was enacted in 1966 to create legis-
latively a public right of access to records held by the federal government. The policy
underlying the FOIA was "to ensure an informed citizenry . . . needed to check
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.' '2 At first,
the FOIA was used primarily by newspapers to gain access to government documents
containing newsworthy information, such as the extent to which the White House
may have used the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain derogatory information
about political opponents 3 or the records of investigations by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration into safety defects in new automobiles. 4 Other groups
soon uncovered a different use of the FOIA-what one commentator has described as
"industrial espionage." 5 A number of businesses discovered that they could submit
FOIA requests to government agencies that hold records and data acquired from other
businesses in the same industry. 6 These records and data often contained valuable
commercial intelligence that would otherwise have been unobtainable. Although
Congress anticipated this problem and included in the FOIA a way for agencies to
decline to release confidential commercial information, 7 the FOIA mandate opening
agency records to public inspection required that the agency not be compelled to
withhold such information.
While the extent to which businesses actually have suffered from the discre-
tionary power of agencies to withhold or release confidential commercial information
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978). During the Senate debates on the 1974 FOIA
amendments, Senator Kennedy observed:
The processes of Government touch almost every aspect of our lives, every day. From the food we eat to the
cars we drive to the air we breathe, Federal agencies constantly monitor and regulate and control .... The
Freedom of Information Act guarantees citizen access to Government information and provides the key for
unlocking the doors to a vast storeroom of information.
Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Governmental Disclosures of Business Data,
1981 Wis. L. Ray. 207 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 17,015 (1974)).
3. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 618 (1982).
4. Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1322 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
5. Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 113 (1980).
6. See IV. CASEY, J. MARTINuSEN & L. Moss, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Act 25 (1983) [hereinafter ENTREPRENEuR HiP]; see, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 566
F.2d 242, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (request for documents relating to licensing agreement between Air Force and requester's
competitor covering computerized legal research system); Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 134 (3d Cir.
1974) (request for list of persons registered as amateur winemakers so that requester could mail catalogs to them); Timken
Co. v. United States Customs Serv., 491 F. Supp. 557, 558 (D.D.C. 1980) (request for documents giving apppraised
value of imported roller bearings and components).
7. See infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
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remains unclear, 8 many businesses perceive themselves as victims. 9 Moreover, these
businesses have devised a form of lawsuit not contemplated by the drafters of the
FOIA-the "reverse FOIA" action. In a reverse FOIA action, private businesses that
submit information to federal agencies (submitters) seek to enjoin an agency from
disclosing the submitters' information to third-party requesters. The courts have
allowed these reverse FOIA suits with the justification that there is an implied private
right of action under the statute. 10 However, the courts have failed to resolve some
major problems left open by the few Supreme Court decisions in this area. The most
troublesome problem is determining the proper scope of review when a federal court
considers an agency's decision to disclose information which the submitter insists
should be withheld. 1
This Comment will address this problem and recommend the proper scope of
review. First, the Comment will briefly examine the general structure of the FOIA
and the standards applicable to requesters of information. Next, it will move beyond
the relationship between the agency and the requester and consider how and why
submitters have fought for-and acquired-some substantive and procedural protec-
tion of their information. The Comment will then discuss the use of the de novo
standard of review by some courts. Finally, it will argue that absent an amendment
by Congress to the FOIA, such a rigorous standard is contrary to prior Supreme Court
interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act. 12
II. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE FOIA
A. Historical Background
The Freedom of Information Act was first enacted in 196613 to amend section 3
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.14 In Congress' view, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act had failed to require sufficient disclosure of information
8. See ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 6, at 47-86 (empirical study of FOIA requests). Agencies receiving large
numbers of FOIA requests--the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Federal Reserve Board-collected the most commercially valuable
information. See id. at 63-66. For instance, the EPA and the FDA collect valuable information on process technologies
and chemical formulas in performing their regulatory functions. See id. at 87.
9. See ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 6, at 88-89 (citing incident in which Proctor & Gamble submitted trade
secret information about an odor-masking agent for sterilized medical products; the report containing trade secret infor-
mation was inadvertently mailed to a competitor even though the company had provided the FDA with an abbreviated
report for public disclosure). But see Connelly, supra note 2, at 209 (claiming that such perceptions are "'based on highly
impressionistic assessments rather than upon systematic analysis of who is trying to find out what under the FOIA").
10. See infra note 75.
11. See Stevenson, Protecting Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act: Managing Exemption 4,
34 ADMIN. L. REV. 207, 251 (1982).
12. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559 (1988).
13. Government Information-Public Access, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). The text of the original Act is reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (80 Stat.)
282 and the legislative history is reprinted id. at 2418.
14. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (originally codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002 and
now codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). For an exhaustive study of foreign public disclosure acts, see Relyea,
Business, Trade Secrets, and Information Access Policy Developments in Other Countries: An Overview, 34 ADnmi. L.
REv. 315 (1982).
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held by federal agencies.15 Although it right of public access to agency records is not
mandated expressly by the Constitution, the legislative history of the FOIA recog-
nized the importance of this right to the underlying philosophy of the Constitution:
"A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelli-
gence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies." 16
The FOIA has undergone many amendments, most notably in 1974, when
Congress acted to prevent agencies from stalling in response to FOIA requests by
imposing mandatory time limits in which agencies must respond to these requests.17
Throughout its twenty-four-year history, the guiding theme of the FOIA has been the
disclosure of information.18
B. Structure of FOIA
The expansive nature of the FOIA's right of access to agency records is clear
from the language of the Act. In addition to the general obligations placed on
agencies to publish information about their official activities in the Federal
Register,19 the Act also mandates that "each agency, upon any request for records
which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with
published rules ... shall make the records promptly available to any person.' '20 The
term "person" is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act to include "an indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other
than an agency.' '21 Courts have held that neither the identity nor the motives of the
requester is relevant for the purpose of determining that person's right to request
information under the FOIA.22 In short, a key feature of the FOIA is that literally
15. Section 3(e) of the APA of 1946 provided as follows: "'PUBLIC RECORDS.- Save as otherwise required by
statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and
directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found." Id. The legislative history of the Act
commented that:
The public-information provisions of section 3 are of the broadest application because, while some functions and
some operations may not lend themselves to formal procedure, all administrative operations should as a matter
of policy be disclosed to the public except as secrecy may obviously be required or only internal agency
"housekeeping" arrangements may be involved.
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CoNG. SERV. 1195, 1206 [hereinafter H.R. REP.
1980].
For discussions of the drawbacks of APA § 3, see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979); EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973); H.R. RE. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2418 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 1497]; J. O'RELLY, FEDERAL INr-oP OR'roN DiscLosuPs: PocEuRms, Foiuts,
AND THE LAw § 2.02 (1989).
16. H.R. REP. 1497, supra note 15, at 2429. The same public policy underlies some foreign public disclosure
statutes as well. For example, Sweden has had a statutory right of public access to government records since 1766. See
Relyea, supra note 14, at 320. This statute, the Freedom of the Press Act, mandates that "[t]o further free interchange
of opinions and enlightenment of the public every Swedish national shall have free access to official documents." Id.
(citation omitted).
17. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
18. See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 292.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I)-(2)(1988).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1988).
22. Thus, acquiring standing in FOIA litigation is rarely a problem for the requester. One court commented that
"there is no statutory bar to the military attache of the Soviet embassy filing FOIA requests for information from the CIA
and the FBI on the same basis as a United States citizen." Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 730-31 n.ll
(D.C. Cir. 1981). However, the same court also emphasized that a "nonexistent entity concocted out of thin air" might
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anyone can simply send a request letter of the appropriate department of an agency
and thereby institute an FOIA proceeding.
Moreover, the FOIA requires that each agency initially respond to a request for
information within ten days of receipt of the request by either granting access to the
information or explaining why the agency will not disclose the information.2 If the
agency denies disclosure and the requester appeals the decision through the appro-
priate agency channels, then the agency must rule on the appeal within twenty days
of receiving the request for an appeal. 24 Although these time constraints impose a
severe burden on many agencies both in terms of employee resources and interference
with other agency work, the 1974 amendments establishing these limits have never
been modified or repealed.
The FOIA provides for some leeway to alleviate the cost to the agency of
responding to requests in such a short time. First, the agency may extend these time
limits for up to ten days upon written notice to the requester, provided that certain
"unusual circumstances"5 exist. The term "unusual circumstances" is only loosely
defined in the statute and thus gives the agency added flexibility. Second, these time
limits can be extended provided that the agency is "exercising due diligence" in
responding to the request. 26 This exception is obviously designed to allow the agency
a reasonable amount of time to compile and copy large quantities of data or other
records.
If the agency fails to disclose the requested records within these time constraints
or, more typically, if the agency refuses to disclose them to the requester on the
theory that the records are exempt from disclosure, the requester is then granted the
right to a de novo determination by a federal district court as to whether the agency
properly withheld the records.27 The requester has an immediate accrual of a cause of
action "in the interests of timely disclosure" 28 from the agency. In such a proceed-
ing, the standard of review under the APA is whether the agency's action in not
disclosing the record is "unwarranted by the facts.''29 The court is permitted to go
beyond any administrative record established in the prior proceedings within the
agency (for example, the findings of the agency and any documents or comments
submitted by the requester) and make independent findings of fact. 30 De novo review,
lack standing and that a lawyer is obligated to know something about his client because "what he says to the court...
often implicitly are representations about his client's position and existence." Id. Thus, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 might authorize
sanctions against an attorney who represents an organization in an FOIA suit if the organization is in reality a "nonexistent
entity" fabricated by the client.
For a detailed discussion of the scope of standing requirements in FOIA litigation, see Annotation, Who Has Standing
to Seek Access to Agency Information Under Freedom of Information Act, 82 A.L.R. FED. 248 (1987). See also J.
O'Rmuy, supra note 15, at §§ 5.04, 8.07.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1988).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1988).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1988).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1988).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988). These statutory time limits provide for "constructive exhaustion" of admin-
istrative remedies within the agency. See Spannaus v. United States, 824 F.2d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
28. Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 58. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1988).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1988).
30. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); see also 5 K. DAvis,
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in effect, is the strictest scrutiny possible by a court reviewing an administrative
proceeding because it allows the court to disregard the agency's factual findings and
start the review process anew.
C. Requesters' Rights: In Sum
The FOIA grants requesters of agency records substantial rights to fulfill the
policy of encouraging agencies to disclose information. A more in-depth analysis of
the procedure for making an FOIA request is beyond the scope of this Comment. 3'
For purposes of this Comment, there are three important observations to be made
regarding the relationship between agencies and requesters. First, the FOIA repre-
sents a policy choice to place requesters' interests above those of the agencies, even
though this often channels agency resources away from their primary purposes of
promulgating and enforcing regulations and making adjudications. Second, any per-
son can request agency records, regardless of his or her intended use of the infor-
mation, and the agency is obligated to respond in a timely manner. Third, Congress
has explicitly granted requesters a right to de novo judicial review of any adverse
decisions by the agency regarding their request. Congress rarely provides for such an
expansive scope of review by the courts. In the case of agency refusals to disclose
records, however, Congress has determined that the courts should have considerable
power to question agency discretion.
III. REVERSE FOIA Surfs
A. Submitters' Concerns
The parties affected by the FOIA are not limited to the agency and the requester.
Federal agencies collect increasing amounts of information from those they regulate
through a variety of methods including license applications, bids for government
contracts, enforcement of agency regulations, and continuous monitoring of eco-
nomic activity. 32 Some firms voluntarily submit this information because they want
a government contract while others are forced to submit it because the agency's
regulations require the submission. Regardless of whether the submission is made
voluntarily or involuntarily, many submitters of records and data are concerned about
what happens to this information when a third party requests the agency to disclose
it under the FOIA. 33 Because these third parties may include competing foreign
ADw.NISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.4 (2d ed. 1984); L. MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 6.14
(1982).
31. For more in-depth discussions of FOIA suits, see generally A. ADLER, LInGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM
OF INFORmATION Acr AND PRIVACY ACT (10th ed. 1985); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK § 10 (1985); NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, OBTAINING ACCESs TO GOVERNMENT
RECORDS AND PRoTEcnNG THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF CORPORATE RECORDS (1979); J. O'RELuY, supra note 15; J. ROSENFED,
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr. BUSiNESS UsEs (BNA Corporate Practice Series No. 14, 1985); Annotation, Scope of
Review Under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 522(a)(3)), of Administrative Agency's Withholding of Records,
7 A.L.R. FED. 876 (1971 & Supp. 1989).
32. See, e.g., ENTRPEPRENtRuStP, supra note 6, at 47-86; Note, supra note 5, at 109.
33. In McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency
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businesses, the political significance of submitters' concerns encompasses both do-
mestic and foreign policy. 34
When Congress amended section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act to grant
access to records to anyone and not just to "persons properly and directly
concerned, ' 35 it foresaw the potential for abuse of the FOIA to gain economically
valuable confidential information to the detriment of parties having a justifiable
expectation that the information would be used only by the agency to meet its needs.
Congress was also concerned that the submitters would deprive agencies of infor-
mation vital to fulfilling their regulatory mandate out of a distrust of the agencies'
ability to keep the information secret. 36 Therefore, Congress included in the FOIA
nine exemptions 37 representing its "determination of the types of information that the
executive branch must have the option to keep confidential if it chooses." 38 The
exemption relevant to this Comment is Exemption 4, which provides that disclosure
is not required if the information sought consists of "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. ' 39
B. Exemption 4
Exemption 4 applies to two categories of submitted information: (1) trade se-
crets; or (2) information that is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a
Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837, 849-50(1980), the authors note the usefulness of safety testing data acquired
by a competitor through the use of the FOIA. For instance, the data could be used by a competitor in support of its
application to a regulatory agency for approval of an equivalent product, thereby depriving the submitting firm, which
conducted the testing, of substantial lead time in obtaining approval that the firm could use to recoup the cost of the
testing. Id. at 849 & n.59. The authors decline to address the issue of whether the submitter had a right to recoup this
cost by charging noncompetitive prices. They suggest, though, that a competitor might use this testing data to obtain
foreign licenses to market competing products abroad. Id. at 849-50. If true, this would pose a potentially serious risk
of substantial competitive harm to the submitter.
See also O'Reilly, Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. Cm. L. R~v. 1,
3 (1985) [hereinafter O'Reilly, Knowledge]. The author notes that innovative drug manufacturers that create new drugs
often have difficulty recouping the cost of researching and developing these products when generic drug manufacturers
obtain testing data submitted to the FDA by the innovator through an FOIA request. Use of this data by generic drug
manufacturers when applying for regulatory licenses lowers market entry barriers to the generic drug firms because they
can forego expensive trial-and-error testing. Id.
34. Echoing recent demands for protection of American industry from allegedly unfair foreign competitive prac-
tices, one commentator asserted that the budget allocated for processing FOIA requests "was subsidizing Swedish ball
bearing makers... and French aviation firms." O'Reilly, Regaining a Confidence: Protection of Business Confidential
Data Through Reform of the Freedom of Information Act, 34 ADMtN.L. REv. 263, 264 (1982) [hereinafter O'Reilly,
Confidence].
35. H.R. RE'. 1980, supra note 15.
36. H.R. REP. 1497, supra note 15. Although the House report accurately reflects a legislative intent to protect
commercial information submitted to agencies in certain circumstances, it does not represent the "true" legislative history
because the report was written after the Senate passed the bill. Hence, the Senate report is the better general source of
legislative history for the FOIA. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-67 (1976).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
38. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). While the executive branch retains some discretion to determine the
type of information it keeps confidential, the broad agency discretion endorsed in this decision has been limited by
congressional adoption of a statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988), that narrows this exemption. Phillipi v. CIA, 546
F.2d 1009, 1011 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also National Parks & Conserv. Ass'n. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (purposes of the FOIA include protecting persons submitting information to government agencies).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
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person, 40 and (c) privileged or confidential. 41 Unfortunately, Congress did not define
any of these terms in either the FOIA or the Administrative Procedure Act.
1. Trade Secrets
When the courts first wrestled with the general concept of "trade secrets," they
tended to adopt the definition of "trade secret" in the Restatement of Torts. 42 More
recently, other courts, led by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, adopted a narrower definition because the Restatement version seemed to include
almost everything. 43
The Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.44 held that when submitted
information is recognized as a trade secret property right under the law of the forum
state, that information is property protected by the takings clause of the fifth
amendment. 45 In Monsanto, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was au-
thorized under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)46 to
use data acquired from companies to evaluate the applications of such companies for
federal registration of their products under this Act. 47 The Act also authorized the
EPA to disclose to the public any information it acquired under the Act, unless the
40. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1988).
41. See National Parks, 498 F.2d at 766.
42. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it .... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.
REsTATFNr OF ToRTs § 757 comment b (1939).
However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts deleted this and other related sections because they no longer rely on
traditional principles of tort law. 4 RsrATEstEr (SEcom)) OF Torfs 1 (1977). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1979 was
intended to fill this gap. To date, approximately half of the states have adopted it. 14 U.L.A. 369 (Supp. 1989). The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that:
"Trade Secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNit'. TRADE S crs Act, 14 U.L.A. 541,542 (1979). See also Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452,457 (1868) (landmark
case declaring "[ilt is the policy of the law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage and protect invention and
commercial enterprise"). See generally Annotation, Disclosure of Trade Secret as Abandonment of Secrecy, 92 A.L.R.3d
138 (1979).
43. Compare Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (noting that Ohio, like many other
states, has adopted the Restatement definition of "trade secret") with Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704
F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (adopting a narrow definition of "trade secret" in the FOIA after finding no support
for the proposition that Congress intended a broader definition: "we define trade secret... as a secret, commercially
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort").
44. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
45. Id. at 1000-04. See generally Comment, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the Fifth Amendment: The New
Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 334 (1987) (discussing the impact of Monsanto). The protection of trade secrets
was relegated to state law when the Supreme Court declared: "There is no federal general common law." Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally C. Wtucrr, LAw OF FEDERAL CoUR-rs § 60 (4th ed. 1983).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
47. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 990-93. FIFRA required all manufacturers of insecticides, fungicides, and ro-
denticides to register their products prior to sale in interstate or foreign commerce. FIFRA, as amended, regulated the use,
sale, and labelling of these products. Congress enacted FIFRA to address public concern regarding the safety of these
products and the products' adverse effects on the environment. Id.
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company designated the information as a "trade secret" in advance. 48 However, such
designations were not binding on the EPA; the EPA could challenge the company's
classification. In turn, the company could institute a declaratory judgment action in
federal district court to enjoin the EPA from disclosing the information. 49
Monsanto brought a declaratory judgment action to enjoin the EPA from making
any future disclosures under FIFRA.50 Monsanto alleged that the disclosure provi-
sions of the Act effected a taking of its valuable commercial property without just
compensation and that the taking was for a private use because Monsanto's compet-
itors could acquire its trade secrets.5 1 The Supreme Court looked to the law of
Missouri, the forum state, which had adopted the definition of "trade secrets"
suggested by the Restatement of Torts section 757.52 The Supreme Court then held
that Missouri law granted a property right in trade secrets.
5 3
The Monsanto case did not involve the FOIA, but it did state that submitters of
data which constitute intangible property protected by state law deserved protection
under the takings clause of the fifth amendment.5 4 Accordingly, if an agency exer-
cises its discretion to release information to a requester when this information is
protected by the forum state's trade secret law, this disclosure might constitute a
taking in violation of the submitter's fifth amendment rights, 55 unless the government
can show that the taking was for a public use. 56
A strong case can be made for denying fifth amendment protection to most
businesses that submit commercial information to the federal government. The Court
in Monsanto noted that
as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the
conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary submission
of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration [with the
EPA] can hardly be called a taking.5 7
Forced disclosure of commercial information required by an agency to fulfill its
mandate should survive a takings claim as a reasonable regulation of interstate com-
merce. If the agency later misuses this information by disclosing it illegally (for
48. Id. at 992.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 998-99.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1001; see supra note 42.
53. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984).
54. Id. at 1003-04.
55. Id. at 1004-14. See also Comment, supra note 45, at 358-59.
56. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014-19. The Court noted that Congress apparently intended that the EPA's use
of data collected pursuant to FIFRA either did not constitute a fifth amendment taking or that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1982) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the U.S. Claims Courts for suits against the United States government
that are "founded... upon the Constitution"), was a sufficient remedy should a taking occur. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
1019. Thus, a district court would lack jurisdiction in equity to enjoin a taking under these circumstances. See id; see
generally 14 C. vtrT, A. Mt1.usP & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PAcncE AND PRocuEtns § 3657 (1985).
57. Monsonto 467 U.S. at 1007. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text for discussion of submitters'
procedural due process rights.
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example, in violation of state trade secret law), then the submitter can seek just
compensation through the Tucker Act.5
8
2. Other Information
When interpreting the terms "commercial" and "financial" for purposes of the
FOIA Exemption 4,59 courts have consistently held that these terms should be given
their ordinary meanings. 60 In general, few businesses have had any problem estab-
lishing that their information fits into one of these two categories, although employ-
ment lists created some interpretative problems until Chrysler Corp. v. Brown.6 1
The term "confidential" has generated considerably more litigation. Courts now
follow an objective test: Information is "confidential" if its disclosure would be
likely to either (1) "impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information
in the future;" or (2) "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained.' 62 Under the second prong of the
test, the parties opposing disclosure need not "show actual competitive harm";
rather, it is sufficient that they show some evidence of both "[a]ctual competition and
the likelihood of substantial competitive injury." 63 The court must also look at the
cost to requesters of acquiring the information sought from sources other than the
disclosing agency. 64
"Privileged" information is any financial or commercial information that would
customarily be subject to one of the traditional privileges, such as doctor-patient,
attorney-client, or lender-borrower. 65 Few agencies have relied heavily on this ele-
ment of Exemption 4 because another exemption, Exemption 6, applies to certain
privileges as well. Exemption 6 provides that disclosure is not required if the infor-
mation sought consists of "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ',66
58. See supra note 56. See also MeGarity & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 862 (suggesting that a less rigorous
definition of trade secrets should apply in the "public law context of information submitted to government agencies").
59. See supra note 39.
60. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 266 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 795 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
627 F.2d 392, 403 & n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. Most requests for employment lists or
"manning tables" have been by public interest groups seeking to determine a company's equal opportunity hiring
performances, suggesting that no real commercial significance attaches to this data. See ENTREPRENEURSHtP, supra note 6,
at 97.
62. National Parks & Conserv. Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
63. Gulf & \Vestem Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1979). No likelihood of competitive
harm was shown by a company seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from releasing a telephone directory of the
munitions manufacturer's plant personnel at an Army base when the directory had been prepared by the company at
government expense and for government use. Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, 839 F.2d 1027 (4th Cir. 1988). The court affirmed
that deleting the home telephone numbers of key personnel was sufficient protection. id. at 1028.
In addition, the courts need not conduct a sophisticated economic analysis of the likely effects of disclosure. See
National Parks & Conserv. Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 681 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
64. Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. H.R. REP. 1497, supra note 15, at 10; see also Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-67
(1976).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). See also J. O'RE.LY, supra note 15, § 14.09.
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C. Litigation of Reverse FOIA Suits
1. Lack of Substantive Protection of Submitters
The language of Exemption 4 and the tests articulated by the courts suggest that
businesses are granted broad protection from disclosure of their confidential com-
mercial information which is submitted to agencies. However, it must be stressed that
the FOIA does not compel an agency to withhold documents falling within Exemption
4; to the contrary, the Act authorizes the agency to disclose the information despite
the submitters' requests for confidentiality if the agency determines that the submit-
ters' interests in confidentiality are outweighed by the public's interest in disclosure.
The FOIA is a disclosure statute. An agency acts within the clear bounds of its
discretion if it chooses to disclose information that would otherwise fall within one
of the nine exemptions. 67
Thus, the agencies retain substantial power to determine the confidentiality of
the submitter's information. As the Supreme Court has noted: "[T]he congressional
concern was with the agency's need or preference for confidentiality; the FOIA by
itself protects the submitters' interest in confidentiality only to the extent that this
interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the information." 6 8 Even if the agency,
pursuant to a presubmission confidentiality agreement, 69 was to classify the submit-
67. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291 (1979).
68. Id. at 292-93.
69. Many federal agencies have promulgated regulations that allow submitters to request confidential treatment of
all or a portion of their information at the time they submit it. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(h)(4)(ii) (1989) (IRS); 12
C.F.R. § 261.17(a) (1989) (Federal Reserve Board (FRB)); 15 C.F.R. § 4.10(0 (1989) (Federal Trade Comm'n); 16
C.F.R. § 1015.18(c) (1989) (consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n); 17 C.F.R. § 145.9(d) (1989) (Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(f) (1989) (SEC); 19 C.F.R. § 201.6 (1989) (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n); 21 C.F.R.
§ 20.44 (1989) (FDA); 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(b) (1988)(EPA); 47 C.F.R. § 0.459 (1988) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1001.5(c)(1)(i)
(1988) (Interstate Commerce Comm'n (ICC)).
All executive branch agencies are now required to establish prediselosure notification procedures whenever a request
is made for information that is arguably exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4. See Executive Order No. 12,600,
52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1989). Generally the agency regulations grant
a submitter up to 15 days after receipt of a prediselosure notice to justify continued confidential treatment of its submitted
information. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(h)(5) (1989) (IRS; 10 work days); 12 C.F.R § 261.17(b)(3) (1989) (FRB;
10 work days); 15 C.F.R. § 4.7(e) (1989) (Dept. of Commerce; 7 work days); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(d)(1) (1989) (SEC;
10 calendar days); 19 C.F.R. § 201.20(f) (1989) (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n; at least one work day before the Trade
Commission must respond to the FOIA request); 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e)(2) (1988) (EPA; 15 work days); 49 CF.R. §
1001.5(d)(1) (1988) (ICC; 10 work days).
These regulations generally require the agency to consider carefully the submitter's objections and grounds for
nondisclosure prior to determining whether or not to disclose the requested information. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. §
601.702(h)(6) (1989) (IRS must "consider carefully" objections and state reasons for not sustaining them); 12 C.F.R. §
261.17(d) (1989) (FRB must give reasons for intended disclosure); 15 C.F.R. § 4.7(0 (1989) (Dept. of Commerce must
"carefully consider" objections and state reasons for not sustaining them); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(e) (1989) (administrative
appeal procedures established within SEC to handle denials of confidential treatment); 19 C.F.R. § 201.19(g) (1989)
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n; same as IRS); 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(0(2) (1988) (EPA must state basis for denial of confidential
treatment); 49 C.F.R. § 1001.5(e) (1988) (ICC; same as IRS).
If the agency decides to disclose this information, these regulations afford the submitter a period of time after
receiving notice of the agency's intent to disclose during which the submitter may petition a court for a stay or other
judicial remedy. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(h)(6)(iii) (1989) (IRS; 10 work days); 12 C.F.R. § 261.17(d) (1989)
(FRB; 10 work days); 15 C.F.R. § 4.7(f)(3) (1989) (Dept. of Commerce; 7 work days); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(e)(4) (1989)
(SEC; 10 calendar days. The SEC regulation also provides for automatic stay of disclosure if the submitter notifies the
agency that it is seeking federal judicial relief during this period. Id. at § 200.83(e)(5).); 19 C.F.R. § 201.9(g) (1989)
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ter's information as confidential, courts have held that such a promise is not of itself
sufficient to defeat subsequent agency disclosures. 70
Such comments by the courts understandably worry submitters. 7' The FOIA was
intended to increase public access to agency records under the rationale of encour-
aging open government.72 It is one thing to require public agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose the
contents of their files on certain individuals or official activities. 73 On the other hand,
it seems unfair to subject private firms to the same standards as government agencies.
It can even be argued that Congress intended the FOIA to reveal only "public actions,
not private commercial actions that happened to be recorded in government appli-
cation files. '74
Business submitters began to seek protection of their confidential commercial
information by filing reverse FOIA suits. 75 Submitters would seek an injunction from
a district court to enjoin an agency from disclosing the information. Although most
courts found some basis to grant an injunction in clear cases of likely competitive
harm, 76 the courts could not avoid the problem that the FOIA did not explicitly
provide for reverse FOIA suits.
2. The Chrysler Case
The Supreme Court defined the scope of reverse FOIA suits in Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown.77 Chrysler had numerous government contracts and was therefore required
to supply the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (Compliance Office)
and other agencies with "manning tables." These detailed analyses of Chrysler's
labor force were used by the Compliance Office to ensure that Chrysler was providing
nondiscriminatory employment opportunities. 78 The agency responsible for monitor-
ing Chrysler's employment practices, the Department of Defense's Defense Logistics
Agency, notified Chrysler that it had received an FOIA request for certain employ-
ment data submitted by Chrysler. When the Defense Logistics Agency determined
that this data was not within the FOIA Exemption 4 or the Compliance Office's
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n; "reasonable number of days prior to the specified disclosure date"); 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(0(2)
(1988) (EPA; 10 work days); 49 C.F.R. § 1001.5(e)(3)(1988) (ICC; 10 work days).
70. Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
71. See generally O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 263.
72. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Ely v. FBI, 781 F.2d 1487 (1th Cir. 1986); Phillipi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(request for information regarding allegedly covert use by CIA of the ship Hughes Glomar Explorer).
74. O'Reilly, Knowledge, supra note 33, at 8 n.38. O'Reilly quotes a statement by Assistant Attorney General
Norbert Schlei before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary in 1964: "[N]ot only as a matter of fairness, but as a matter of right, and as a matter basic to our free enterprise
system, private business information should be afforded appropriate protection." Id.
75. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979).
76. See, e.g.. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977) (finding implied right of supplier of private information to invoke equity jurisdiction of courts to enjoin
the disclosure of information within Exemption 4); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
519 F.2d 935, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (affirming district court injunction against disclosure until administrative record
is sufficient for trial court to determine whether disclosure is an abuse of discretion).
77. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
78. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 286. See supra note 61.
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disclosure rules, Chrysler brought a reverse FOIA action to enjoin disclosure by the
Defense Logistics Agency. 79
The Supreme Court in Chrysler held that the FOIA is exclusively a disclosure
statute and does not afford submitters such as Chrysler any right to enjoin agency
disclosure. 80 The Court also refused to find an implied private right of action under
the Trade Secrets Act 8' because that Act is a criminal statute and there was no basis
for inferring that Congress had intended to create a private right of action under it.82
However, the Court did not thereby destroy the vitality of reverse FOIA actions
because it also found a right to enjoin agency action under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, specifically APA section 706(2)(A). 83 This provision permitted Chrysler
to seek an injunction against the agency's disclosure if disclosure would be "not in
accordance with law"; that is, if it violated the Trade Secrets Act.
Because the Trade Secrets Act and the FOIA Exemption 4 are coextensive in
scope, 84 it might also be possible to enjoin the agency from disclosing information
within Exemption 4 as action "not in accordance with law." The Court rejected that
argument because the Trade Secrets Act only prohibits disclosures "not authorized by
law" and the agency had promulgated substantive rules permitting disclosure which
had the force and effect of law.85 Thus, as one commentator observed, "[a]gencies
can . . . avoid the prohibition of section 1905 [of the Trade Secrets Act], and thus
retain their discretion to disclose confidential business information, by promulgating
binding rules that permit such disclosures.' '86 If a court finds that the information
falls within Exemption 4 (and therefore also the Trade Secrets Act), but the agency
also has promulgated substantive rules authorizing it to disclose this information
anyway, the disclosure is "authorized by law" and the agency cannot then be
enjoined from disclosing the information.
The Court then turned to the issue of the proper scope of review by a district court
when determining whether disclosure is "not in accordance with law" because it
would violate the Trade Secrets Act. Section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure
Act provides that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;... [or] unwarranted by the facts to the extent
79. Chrysler, like other submitters of manning tables, feared that competitors might be able to use the tables to
determine its labor costs, plans for expansion, and so forth. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Servs. Admin.,
553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
80. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 294. The Court focused on the legislative history of the FOIA and the Act's provision
on judicial relief that did not give the district court authority to bar disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). The Trade Secrets Act is a criminal statute forbidding any federal officer or employee
from in any manner disclosing confidential commercial information obtained in the course of the employee's employment
or official duties.
82. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979).
83. Id. at 312-16, 318.
84. Id. at 319 n.49 ("Although there is a theoretical possibility that material might be outside Exemption 4 yet
within the substantive provisions of § 1905 ... that possibility is at most of limited practical significance in view of the
similarity of language between Exemption 4 and ... § 1905.").
85. Id. at 295.
86. Note, supra note 5, at 115.
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that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.' 87 The Court declined
to resolve this issue in Chrysler because the issue was not properly before the Court
(the court of appeals had not reached it), but did comment that "[d]e novo review by
the district court is ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a contemplated dis-
closure runs afoul of [section] 1905."8 8 The lower courts since then have been
struggling to formulate a workable standard that balances the rights of submitters with
Congress' decision in the FOIA not to grant de novo review to submitters.
IV. DE Novo Raviuw
A. Scope of Review Under the APA
When reviewing agency actions, the APA mandates that the "reviewing court
shall ...hold unlawful and set aside agency action[s], findings, and conclusions
found" to violate one of six standards. 89 Two of the standards, the "substantial
evidence" test of APA section 706(2)(E) and the "unwarranted by the facts" test of
APA section 706(2)(F), require the reviewing court to consider the factual record that
was before the agency when it made its decision. The abuse of discretion test ("ar-
bitrary or capricious") applies in all cases. 9° This standard requires that an agency's
decision be based on consideration of all the relevant factors and not be a clear error
of judgment; however, under this narrow standard, the court "is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."- 91
Under the FOIA, the scope of review of an agency decision to withhold infor-
mation from a requester is subject to de novo review because of an express statutory
mandate. 92 De novo review requires the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence
compiled by the agency to determine whether the agency's findings are correct, not
just whether they are reasonable. 93 Because the FOIA is silent on reverse FOIA actions
by submitters, the determination of the proper scope of review is more troublesome.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (F) (1988).
88. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979) (emphasis added).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). The text of the statute provides as follows:
Mhe reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
Id.
90. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971).
91. Id. at 416. But see Levin, Scope of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38
AwMiw. L. REv. 239 (1986) (criticizing vague labels used in the APA and formulated by courts interpreting the APA's
scope of review provisions, and recommending several amendments to the APA).
92. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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At the minimum, the agency action must withstand the abuse of discretion standard,
of course, but many commentators and some courts have argued in favor of a de novo
standard of review despite the lack of an express statutory authorization. 94
B. Argument for De Novo Review
The main problem with reverse FOIA suits is that there is little record of what
occurred previously between the submitter and the agency when the suit finally
arrives in the courtroom.95 Typically, the submitter first receives a perfunctory notice
from the agency (assuming that the agency provides such notice) stating that an FOIA
request has been filed requesting disclosure of the submitter's information. 96 The
submitter then has an opportunity to notify the agency if it asserts that some or all of
the information falls within an exemption from disclosure. Due to the expedited
nature of all FOIA requests, 97 the time interval involved is very short. Often the
submitter and agency only exchange a few letters, perhaps three or four.98 Confining
judicial review to this administrative record, which would constitute the entire record
in such an informal proceeding, would inhibit the reviewing court by denying it an
opportunity to assess fully the potential harm to the submitter from disclosure.
An argument in favor of de novo review is that the agencies do not possess
special expertise to resolve disputes over the classification of information the agen-
cies collect. In general, unless Congress has explicitly provided otherwise, courts
defer to an agency's exercise of discretion when the agency has some unique exper-
tise in the area that laymen (and presumably judges) do not possess. 99 This deference
occurs primarily when the agency's discretion requires the use of technical or com-
plex determinations involving the reconciliation or balancing of particular policies. lo
The theory, in part, is that Congress created the agency for the purpose of exercising
this discretion. In such instances, courts recognize that agencies possess some unique
expertise in the area, grounded in both experience and sensitivity to political factors,
which aids the agency in balancing competing interests.' 0' Furthermore, it can per-
haps be inferred that Congress, by enacting the FOIA and adopting stringent con-
straints on agency discretion to withhold information, assumed that agencies would
be more likely to err in favor of withholding. 102 Thus, an automatic mechanism may
exist to safeguard submitters' interests.
Many agencies making FOIA disclosure decisions have worked with the sub-
94. See generally O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34. In general, only "constitutional fact" issues, that is, mixed
questions of constitutional law and fact, merit de novo review by a court. See Dickinson, Crowell & Benson, Judicial
Review ofAdministrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932); see also
5 K. DAvis, supra note 30, at § 29.23.
95. See O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 308-11.
96. Id. at 299.
97. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
98. See O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 299.
99. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
100. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101. Id.
102. Judge Wald noted that prior to the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, so many agencies refused to disclose records
that the FOIA was viewed by some as a paper tiger. Wald, The Freedom ofInformation Act: A Short Case Study in the
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 E.-oRy L.J. 649, 658 (1984).
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mitters for years and are sufficiently familiar with the nature of the information
involved that they can distinguish between genuine cases of likely competitive harm
and mere unsubstantiated claims of potential harm. Therefore, the courts should defer
to the more experienced agencies if for no other reason than judicial economy. In
reality, however, some agencies may lack the expertise which validates judicial
deference to administrative discretion. The argument that federal agencies have
greater expertise in evaluating the confidentiality of information is weakened when
one considers that those who handle FOIA requests do not necessarily have any
expertise in either the technical or the legal aspects of the information disclosure. 103
In addition, Congress generally does not allot budgetary appropriations specifically
for use in FOIA programs, so that much of the funding for responses to FOIA
requests comes from the agencies' overall budgets.t 0 4 Of course, this creates an
incentive for agency personnel handling FOIA requests to minimize the financial and
time costs of processing FOIA requests by using any means possible. 105
In addition, FOIA exemption decisions in which the agency determines whether
the submitters' claimed need for protection is valid in terms of Exemption 4 or the
Trade Secrets Act are equivalent to informal adjudications. 106 Thus, the agency must
interpret the statutory provisions of the FOIA, a function that courts are certainly just
as competent to perform.' 0 7 Because the agency's decision to disclose ultimately
affects the legal rights of the individual submitter, it seems odd to assert that the
agency is more competent to interpret the FOIA than are the courts.
After the Chrysler decision, several courts applied a de novo standard of review
in reverse FOIA cases, or at least recognized the validity of using this standard in
some circumstances. For instance, in Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle,108
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a reverse FOIA action
to the district court for a determination of material disputed facts which were not in
the record and implicitly authorized the district court to conduct a de novo review,
stating that "[t]he district court is free to proceed in whatever manner it finds
appropriate . "1... 09 The Fourth Circuit was more straightforward in approving
the use of de novo review in reverse FOIA actions: "A failure of an agency to offer
a fully reasoned basis for its decision . . . [to disclose] not only may invalidate an
agency's decision but may become a basis for consideration by the district court of
the propriety of de novo review under § 706(2)(F). '"110
103. See Braeman, Overview of FOJA Administration in Government, 34 ADMiN. L. REv. 111, 112 (1982).
104. Id.
105. However, this argument has lost much of its force because many agencies have now established more thorough
methods for evaluating submitters' confidentiality claims. See supra note 69. Agencies can develop more expertise in
these disputes than can the courts because the agencies are more familiar with the actual needs of the industries they
regulate, and because they handle more claims more frequently. Moreover, agencies are not interpreting the FOIA in
general, but rather are determining the applicability of Exemption 4.
106. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1988) (defining an "adjudication" as an agency process for the formulation of an
order).
107. See O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 304.
10P ,2 -. 2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 56.
110. General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing that de novo review is
justified if material facts are in dispute; otherwise, the district court should review the action under the "in accordance
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Thus, the lack of a meaningful record, the lack of any real agency expertise, and
the support of some circuit court opinions all argue in favor of de novo review in
reverse FOIA actions.
C. Argument Against De Novo Review
There are two fundamental reasons why many courts are reluctant to apply a de
novo standard of review in reverse FOIA actions: first, the language and legislative
history of the Act do not authorize it; and second, accepted judicial interpretations of
the Administrative Procedure Act do not require it.
Despite the numerous recommendations favoring an amendment to the FOIA to
include a right to de novo review of agency disclosure decisions,I' every attempt to
amend the Act has died in Congress.112 Although business special interest groups
might very well persuade Congress to amend the FOIA to grant a statutory right to
a reverse FOIA action, at present there is no clear congressional desire to support de
novo review. Perhaps one of the reasons that Congress has been reluctant to amend
the FOIA is that despite the clamoring of business groups which claim frequent
discretionary disclosures of information falling under Exemption 4, no hard evidence
has ever been produced to indicate that such harmful disclosures actually occur. " 3
One commentator placed a notice in the Federal Register in 1980 requesting busi-
nesses to submit evidence of any instances in which an agency disclosed information
over the business' objections and the business, in turn, suffered some harm. Only
nineteen responses were submitted, and of these, only five could reasonably have
been claimed to fall within Exemption 4 or the Trade Secrets Act. 114
Courts have established limited instances in which de novo review of an ad-
ministrative action is justified. First, if Congress expressly requires de novo review,
then the courts will apply this standard.' 5 Second, the Overton Park"16 test is
frequently cited as a ground for applying de novo review. The test is met if (1) "the
action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are
inadequate,""17 or (2) "issues that were not before the agency are raised in a pro-
with law" standard of APA § 706(2)(A)). The district court in Chrysler conducted a de novo review, although the
Supreme Court neglected to address this fact beyond noting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals thought such a review
was improper. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 289 (1979).
111. The most vociferous proponent is James O'Reilly, senior counsel of Procter & Gamble Corporation. See, e.g.,
O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 311-13. See also Administrative Conference of the United States, Exemption
(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Act (Recommendation 82-1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-1 (1984), reprinted in ADttsNtS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 567-7 1.
112. See, e.g., Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1983, 1984 DUKE L.J. 377, 379-85
(describing the Hatch Bill). But see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1986, 1987 DUKE L.J.
521, 534-37 (proposed amendment to allow de novo review of reverse FOIA suits passed House but died in Senate).
113. See Stevenson, supra note 11, at 252 ("evidence to substantiate allegations of the agency bias in favor of
disclosure of business information has not been presented") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61
(1978)). But see O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 270-71.
114. Id. at 220.
115. See O'Reilly, Confidence, supra note 34, at 300.
116. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
117. Id. at 415.
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ceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.""'s The second prong is irrelevant
in the reverse FOIA context because the agency's decision to disclose the information
is "adjudicatory in nature."119
Some courts have applied the first prong in the reverse FOIA context to allow
de novo review when the agency's factfinding procedures were inadequate. 20 The
District of Columbia Circuit has held that the characteristics of adequate procedures
are the following: (1) notice to the submitter of the request made under the FOIA; (2)
ability to submit materials supporting their exemption claim to a first-level decision-
maker; (3) the setting out of the agency's position by this decisionmaker; and (4) the
opportunity to appeal the initial disclosure decision within the agency. 121 The case
involved an FOIA request from the National Organization for Women for affirmative
action plans submitted to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (Com-
pliance Office) by three major insurance companies.1 22 The Compliance Office was
found to have disclosed the plans improperly because it failed to offer the companies
adequate fact-finding procedures to assert their need for confidential treatment. 123
The court also observed that the procedures "must be severely defective" before a
violation of this standard would be found. 124 A recent Fourth Circuit case favorably
cited this test. 125 The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that its decision did not fore-
close a party from de novo review of "the adequacy of the agency's factfinding
process," in which the focus of the district court should be the implementation of the
agency's procedure in a given case, not on "the agency's procedure in the ab-
stract." ' 12 6 Both courts rejected earlier cases allowing de novo review in the reverse
FOIA context when the evidence of confidentiality was insufficient on the adminis-
trative record, 27 finding that Chrysler had put the viability of these cases in doubt. 128
118. Id.
119. The APA draws a distinction between actions of agencies that are adjudications and those that are rulemakings.
In general, rulemakings are quasi-legislative whereas adjudications are quasi-judicial. The distinction is often hard to
draw. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(7), 553-557 (1988); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d
325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reverse FOIA actions are in the nature of informal adjudications).
120. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (authorizing de novo review under the APA only when the
agency's fact-finding procedures are inadequate). But see K. DAvIS, ADMuNsrRAmvE LAw TREAnsE § 29.09 (Supp. 1982)
(noting that the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Overton Park and Pitts do not coincide with the Administrative
Procedure Act's legislative history).
121. See National Org. for Women v. Social Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 729-30.
123. Id. at 740-41.
124. Id. at 745.
125. See Acumenics Res. & Technology v. Department of Justice, 843 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1988). Acumenics
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the Department of Justice from releasing pricing information that the company had
submitted to the government as part of a pricing proposal. The Department of Justice contended that the information was
not useful to competitors and had previously been released with Acumenics' knowledge. Id. at 803. The court, however,
was careful to state that its holding was "'confined to the facts of this case." Id. at 805 n.4.
126. Id. at 805 n.5.
127. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924
(1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (arguing
for de novo review because this parallels the de novo right granted to requesters of information; see supra notes 27-30
and accompanying text).
128. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988);
Acumenics, 843 F.2d at 804.
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As noted earlier in this Comment, 129 several agencies have promulgated regu-
lations that allow submitters to claim confidential treatment for the information they
submit to that agency. These regulations are significant for three reasons. First, they
provide submitters with a procedure for asserting their confidentiality claims at the
agency level. The procedures adequately protect the submitters' procedural due pro-
cess interests because the opportunity to comment occurs prior to disclosure130 and
the submitter has a reasonable amount of time to dispute an agency's disclosure
decision. 31 Allowing a submitter more time and additional procedural protection
might even keep properly disclosable agency records from the public because the
submitter could use such procedures as a delaying tactic: if the requester lacks the
financial ability to pursue its request through all of the administrative and judicial
proceedings available to the submitter, the submitter could delay disclosure indefi-
nitely or even prevent disclosure. In short, given the broad prodisclosure policy of the
FOIA,1 32 no court should find such regulations procedurally inadequate.
Second, these regulations are significant because the threshold issue-whether
or not disclosure will result in competitive harm to the submitter or otherwise violate
Exemption 4 or the Trade Secrets Act-is first determined at the agency level.
Although this issue is both factual and legal, 133 agencies possess sufficient expertise
and knowledge obtained from performing their regulatory functions that they are the
best forum to decide this issue. Because the agencies are charged by Congress with
regulation of specific subject areas, the agencies can best ascertain whether or not the
contemplated disclosure is harmful with respect to standards and practices within the
regulated area. Moreover, the agencies probably have dealt with the submitter, or
others in analogous circumstances, many times in the past. The agencies can use this
experience to assess the credibility of the submitters' claims to a degree beyond the
ability of a court.
Last, these regulations are significant because the agencies' rationales for their
disclosure decisions become a part of the agencies' records. One of the reasons
justifying de novo review was the lack of adequate agency fact-finding procedures,
which made judicial review impossible. 134 These regulations result in creation of a
more complete agency record because they require the submitters to justify nondis-
closure and the agencies to submit their rationale for disclosure. Judicial review upon
an agency record is feasible, so de novo review is unnecessary.
Unless Congress chooses to amend the FOIA, courts cannot impose additional
procedural requirements on agencies in the reverse FOIA context without the risk of
129. See supra note 69.
130. Postdisclosure hearings might be constitutionally inadequate because "the very act of disclosure would destroy
the property interest." Connelly, supra note 2, at 246 n. 189.
131. See supra note 69. Although the time frame within which submitters must assert their claims appears short, it
is important to note that the agency has only 10 days before it is required to respond to the FOIA request. That is, the
policy of the FOIA requires prompt responses.
132. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
133. The factual portion includes the likelihood of competitive harm and the legal portion includes the proper
interpretation by the agency of the standards for determining when Exemption 4 applies,
134. See supra note 128; see also supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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running afoul of the underlying policy of the FOIA-disclosure of agency records.
Although liberal use of de novo review would serve the policy of protecting the
confidentiality interests of submitters, the cost in terms of increased reverse FOIA
suits cannot be ignored. It can be argued that the risk of having commercial infor-
mation leaked to competitors is a reasonable cost of doing business with the gov-
ernment or of obtaining the protection of the country's business laws. Moreover, the
predisclosure notification procedures established by many agencies appear to protect
the submitters' confidentiality interests adequately even without de novo review. If
nonexecutive agencies that have not yet promulgated such predisclosure procedures
would at least follow the recommendations of the District of Columbia Circuit in
National Organization for Women v. Social Security Administration,135 an adequate
agency record for meaningful judicial review would always exist. More importantly
the risk of real economic harm to the submitters would disappear because of the
opportunity, first for predisclosure objection at the agency level, and then for appeal
to a federal district court.
V. CONCLUSION
An unfortunate consequence of the enactment of the FOIA is the risk to submitters
of information to government agencies of having their trade secrets and commercial
information put in the hands of their competitors. The actual threat is unclear, though
some commentators have noted that the victims might not be aware of the disclosures
or perhaps prefer not to publicize it because their stockholders might lose confidence
in them. 136 At any rate, the perceived threat is sufficient justification for some reform
because the alternative would be diminished cooperation by submitters with the
agencies which need the information to accomplish their functions.
The strength of the District of Columbia Circuit's test is its encouragement of
agency development of internal control mechanisms to address the interests of sub-
mitters. Such sophisticated procedures to address submitters' concerns before dis-
closure serve the interests of judicial economy by containing the dispute in the forum
that is best able to evaluate the dispute-the agency. By refusing to apply an "un-
warranted by the facts" test except in cases of clear abuse, the courts can discourage
frivolous claims of confidentiality.
Paul M. Nick
135. 736 F.2d 727, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also supra text accompanying note 121.
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